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1. U.S. Internal Migration Networks, Energy Use, and Emissions
1.1 Introduction
Climate change as a result of carbon emissions is a highly studied and
broad topic in the economics literature. As noted in Glaeser and Kahn (2010),
a significant proportion of US carbon emissions come from household energy
use, and urban structure plays a prominent role in how much energy house-
holds consume. Mangum (2017) and Glaeser and Kahn (2010) have shown
that cities vary greatly in per household levels of emissions, with the high-
emission U.S. cities having nearly twice the per-household emissions as the
low-emission cities. Glaeser and Kahn examine differences in urban struc-
ture and both within city and between city variation in household energy
use. This paper extends this literature by using historic internal migration
data to examine the role migration plays in the total emissions for the U.S.
Given the plethora of local policies on housing and zoning, and the popu-
larity of local green regulations, it is highly unlikely that emissions will be
optimally taxed. As noted by Glaeser and Kahn, even an otherwise perfectly
calibrated Piguvian carbon tax is not sufficient for optimal location decisions
in the presence of local policies or incentives which restrict development in
green areas and subsidized development in less green areas. In reality, the
U.S. has many such policies and incentives. According to Glaeser, “By re-
stricting new development, the cleanest areas are pushing development to
areas of higher emissions” (Glaeser and Kahn). So migration will play a
key role in how optimal emission decisions are made from a country per-
spective, because how the population is distributed and moving among the
cities of various emissions levels affects the total country level of emissions.
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As household migrate between cities, they change their housing consump-
tion, carbon content of electricity and heating, and driving patterns as they
change locations. Any local policies directly or indirectly taxing carbon emis-
sions would have to consider the potential migration effects on emissions an
how movement of households to and from their neighbors contributes to the
national carbon account. Policies in all of the cities are important, as well
as a city’s location in the sense of it’s largest migration neighbors. While
Mangum (2017) considers simulations of national level policies, this paper
focuses on local policies with migration effects following historic migration
patterns. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role migration plays in
the total carbon emissions in the U.S. This paper extends a two-city model
first developed in Glaeser and Kahn (2008). It does this by using city pairs
constructed from data on MSA emissions and MSA-to-MSA migration data.
This will represent the migration effect of the MSA by weighting its migrants
with the per-household emissions of their destination MSA. Each MSA will
thus have different migration effects, for both out- and in- migration, due to
their place in the migration network and the greenness of substitute cities in
their part of the network. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents
the two-city model and the generation process for the representative migra-
tion city. Section 3 describes the data used in the paper. Section 4 details
the results and implications. Section 5 concludes and discusses opportunities
for further research.
1.2 The Two-City Model
This section expands on the two-region model presented in Glaeser and
Kahn (2008). The original model is introduced and then expanded by consid-
2
ering the changes on energy use. The model contains two regions (which will
be defined as cities in this paper) where individuals are free to move between
them to maximize utility. They maximize utility by choosing location and
energy service consumption. The individual wishes to live in the location
where they can get the most utility from energy service consumption, which
depends on the price of energy services and that location’s utility function
with respect to energy. For example, heating and cooling expenses can be
expensive in an area with a very mild climate and total energy service con-
sumption could be lower and yield a higher total utility. With income and
total population being held constant, the model shows that the distribution
of population between regions with different energy prices, energy uses, and
external costs of energy service consumption affects total utility. New zoning
or tax policies cause a movement between cities as well as a change in energy
service consumption within.
The two regions are expanded from abstract areas to constructed empir-
ical areas using migration data to represent the migration effect of a city.
The model is presented and then followed by the representative migration
city construction. The two-city model begins with individuals maximizing a
quasi-linear utility function Yi−PHi − (PEi + t)Ei + tEˆ+Vi(Ei;Xi)−C(NEˆ)
where Yi is income, P
H
i and P
E
i are prices of housing and energy services for
city i; t is an energy use tax; E is energy use in city i; Eˆ is the national
average energy consumption; Vi(.; .) is a function for city-specific benefits
from energy services; Xi is a vector of exogenous attributes for location i;
C(NEˆ) is the external cost of energy use by the whole country, which can
be thought of as the national contribution to climate change; and N is pop-
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ulation. Note that in modeling energy services, I am looking at the cost of,
e.g., maintaining a given temperature in the home, which will be a function
of energy prices but also house size, weather, and so forth. Finally, note
that the tax is revenue neutral, since individuals are receiving a lump sum
rebate of tEˆ. Next, each city i has QFi identical employers, with revenues
f(.) increasing and concave in the the number of people hired. Each city has
builders QBi , with costs k(.) increasing and convex in buildings constructed.
Now wage income is f ′( Ni
QFi
), or the marginal revenue product of labor (MPL),
and housing cost is k′( Ni
QBi
), the marginal cost of supplying housing. Individ-
uals hold equal rights to all business profits. The two equilibrium conditions
are as follows: individuals choose privately optimal energy consumption E∗i
to maximize their utility, so PEi + t = V1(E
∗
i ;Xi), with V1(E
∗
i ;Xi) being the
first derivative of V (.; .) with respect to E. The next condition is a locational
equilibrium, so f ′( Ni
QFi
)−k′( Ni
QBi
)−(t+PEi )E∗i +V (E∗i ;Zi) must be equal for all
cities. Individuals in this model are identical, and the social welfare function
used is additive:∑
i
QFi f(
Ni
QFi
)−QBi k(
Ni
QBi
) + Ni(V (Ei;Xi)− PEi Ei − C(NEˆ)) (1)
So this yields two first order conditions. The first, for energy consumption,
is
PEi Ei −NC
′
(NEˆ) = V1(Ei;Xi) (2)
so that the private optimality condition is socially optimal at a tax of t =
NC
′
(NEˆ). For the last unit of energy service consumption, the price of
energy services plus the optimal tax equals the marginal benefit for the city
of that unit of energy services.
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The first order condition for location decisions is that
f ′(
Ni
QFi
)− k′( Ni
QBi
) + V (E∗i ;Xi)− Ei(PEi + NC
′
(NEˆ)) (3)
is constant over space. Income plus the benefits from energy services, minus
the cost of energy (both price cost and external cost) and cost of housing
must be equal for all locations. This gives a locational equilibrium and there
is no arbitrage opportunity from changing location.
Consider the case of environmentally inspired land use restrictions. A
location can impose a “zoning tax” zi on new construction. Builders in
location 1 now have a first order condition PH1 = z1 + k
′( N1
QB1
). Assume that
the tax is returned to inframarginal residents so as to be revenue neutral.
Here, Glaeser and Kahn (2008) assume that zoning can affect population
sizes but not energy use or energy prices. However, as noted in Mangum
(2017), zoning regulations affect the patterns of energy consumption, and
are not merely an impediment to the movement of households. The effect
of zoning on patterns of energy use in City 1 will be modeled though the
cost of energy services, PE1 . Zoning increases the cost of energy related
services, PE1 . Height restrictions, for example, decrease the ratio of interior
living space to exterior building space, known in the literature as the floor-
area-ratio (FAR), lowering heating and cooling efficiency and making it more
expensive to achieve the same level of energy services E1; it has been shown
that such restrictions are welfare decreasing for the urban resident (Bertaud
and Brueckner 2005, Borck and Brueckner 2018). Any zoning which reduces
density, such as a minimum lot size, green belt, or height restriction (such
as a limit on the FAR) means that the network for electricity must consist
of a higher ratio of infrastructure (such as wires and cables) to buildings
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they service. Electricity transfer over such infrastructure is less than perfect,
so increasing this ratio increases costs of providing any level of electricity.
In the same way, the fuel requirements for transportation would be higher.
Thus
∂PE1
∂z1
> 0. However, it is also possible that added green space reduces
cooling costs and that zoning decreases dwelling unit size, which would have
the opposite effect.
The zoning tax reduces the number of people in location 1. Starting with
the locational equilibrium condition for two cities 1 and 2 after adding the
zoning cost for city 1,
f ′ (N1
(QF1
)− (k′( N1
QB1
) + z1)− (t + PE1 )E∗1 + V (E∗1 ;X1) =
f ′( N2
QF2
)− k′( N2
QB2
)− (t + PE2 )E∗2 + V (E∗2 ;X2).
It is possible to differentiate this condition with respect to zoning z1:
∂
∂z1
[
f ′( N1
QF1
)− (k′( N1
QB1
) + z1)− (t + PE1 )E∗1 + V (E∗1 ;X1) =
f ′( N2
QF2
)− k′( N2
QB2
)− (t + PE2 )E∗2 + V (E∗2 ;X2).
]
which yields the expression:
( 1
QF1
)f ′′( N1
QF1
)(∂N1
∂z1
)− ( 1
QB1
)k′′( N1
QB1
)(∂N1
∂z1
)−1− t(∂E∗1
∂z1
)− (∂PE1
∂z1
)E∗1− (∂E
∗
1
∂z1
)PE1 +
(
∂E∗1
∂z1
)V1(E
∗
1 ;X1) = (
1
QF2
)f ′′( N2
QF2
)(∂N2
∂z1
)− ( 1
QB2
)k′′( N2
QB2
)(∂N2
∂z1
)
First, note that with only two cities, ∂N2
∂z1
= −∂N1
∂z1
. Population gained by
city 2 is population lost by city 1 and vice versa. Secondly, recall the private
energy optimization PEi + t = V1(E
∗
i ;Zi); this cancels terms and leaves the
equation ready to be solved for ∂N1
∂z1
( 1
QF1
)f ′′( N1
QF1
)(∂N1
∂z1
)− ( 1
QB1
)k′′( N1
QB1
)(∂N1
∂z1
)− 1− (∂PE1
∂z1
)E∗1 =
6
(− 1
QF2
)f ′′( N2
QF2
)(∂N1
∂z1
) + ( 1
QB2
)k′′( N2
QB2
)(∂N1
∂z1
)
And thus the resulting equation for ∂N1
∂z1
is:
∂N1
∂z1
=
−1− (∂PE1
∂z1
)E∗1
( 1
QB1
)k′′( N1
QB1
) + ( 1
QB2
)k′′( N2
QB2
)− ( 1
QF1
)f ′′( N1
QF1
)− ( 1
QF2
)f ′′( N2
QF2
)
< 0. (4)
Zoning regulations increase the price of energy services and will cause
additional reduction in population 1 relative to a model where zoning has no
impact on the price of energy services. The impact from the zoning migration
effect on welfare is ((E2 − E1)(NC ′(NEˆ) − t) + z1)(∂N1∂z1 ). (E2 − E1) is the
change in energy consumption from the household moving from city 1 to city
2. (NC
′
(NEˆ) − t) is the external cost of energy use in the zoned city, net
of energy taxes. This is positive as long as (E1 − E2)(NC ′(NEˆ) − t) > z1.
This effect is welfare improving if 1) city 1 was the high energy use city
((E1−E2) > 0) and 2) z1 is smaller than the difference in energy use times the
difference in between social cost of energy use and the energy tax. This is to
say that the zoning tax should not be greater than the external cost of energy
consumption net of taxes. Assuming energy taxes which are smaller than
external cost of energy ((NC
′
(NEˆ)− t) > 0), if city 1 is the low-energy city
((E1 − E2) < 0) then z1 must be welfare reducing. In other words, if zoning
taxes are imposed on low energy use city, they will be counterproductive:
they force population away from low energy-use areas and into high energy-
use areas. Next consider the effect of a zoning tax on energy services E1.
Energy service can be broken down into two main types: in-home energy
and gasoline from driving. Thus E1 can be represented as a function: E1 =
f(Heating(ph(z1), pe, Z1), Electricity(ph(z1), pe, Z1), Driving(ph(z1), pe, Z1. Z1
is a vector of city characteristics such as climate. In-home energy services
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are comprised of heating and electricity, both of which depend on the price
of housing, the price of energy services, and city characteristics. Driving
depends on price of housing, the price of energy services, and city charac-
teristics. The primary interest for energy is the relationship between per-
household energy services and zoning. Thus ∂E1
∂z1
depends on zoning’s effect
on heating, electricity, and driving through price of housing. ∂ph
∂z1
is posi-
tive; as zoning regulations increase, housing prices increase. And for heating
and electricity, ∂Heating(.)
∂z1
and ∂Electricty(.)
∂z1
are negative because of two effects:
higher housing prices lead to smaller houses built and consumed, reducing en-
ergy consumption in-home, because smaller houses will require less energy to
heat and cool and use less electricity. Zoning increases the price of energy ser-
vices PE1 , reducing quantity demanded of these services. Smaller houses built
increases density and reduces average commute distance, reducing driving.
Price of energy services includes gasoline and other transport related expen-
ditures, and thus reduces consumption of these services via driving. Finally,
simulations of zoning regulations on energy use in Mangum (2017) show a
negative correlation at the national level for both in-home energy use and for
driving. Thus ∂E1
∂z1
is negative. When zoning z1 is changed, there are effects on
the extensive ∂N1
∂z1
and intensive ∂E1
∂z1
margins. As noted in Mangum(2017), any
simulation of national policy necessarily involves changes on both margins.
What this means is that high-emission cities will have two carbon-reducing
effects from increased zoning: shifting population to cleaner cities (carbon
decreasing) and lowering per-household carbon use within the city (carbon
decreasing.) However, low-emission cities will have opposing effects from
zoning: they can trade higher per-household energy use for more population
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by decreasing zoning, or trade lower per-household energy use for lower pop-
ulation by increasing zoning. The effect of zoning policies on energy use can
be written as:
∂(NE)
∂z1
=
∂N1
∂z1
[E1 − E2] + ∂E1
∂z1
N1. (5)
The first half is the effect of migration on total energy use; this comes from
multiplying the number of people who move out of city 1, ∂N1
∂z1
, by the energy
use differential between city 1 and city 2, [E1 − E2]. The second half is
the effect of zoning policies on per-household energy use within city 1, ∂E1
∂z1
,
times the population of city 1 N1. Thus equation (5) captures the tradeoffs
mentioned above when considering zoning policies and energy use.
Whereas Glaeser and Kahn (2010) consider the carbon intensity of liv-
ing in arbitrarily compared cities, and whereas Mangum (2017) estimates an
equilibrium model without regards to observed patterns of inter-city substi-
tution, I propose to calibrate the carbon intensity of a city’s relevant sub-
stitutes using the matrix of intercity migration patterns. Thus to expand
the two-city model, and to quantify the counterproductive effects described
in the two-city model, pairs will be constructed for an MSA and its repre-
sentative migration city. Two types of representative cities are constructed
for each MSA: one representing the target of that MSA’s out-migration, and
one representing the origin of that MSA’s in-migration. The representative
out-migration city is a migration-weighted city using all of the cities which
receive migration from the MSA. This represents the yearly flow carbon foot-
print of all migrants moving out of MSA i at year t. For each MSAk which
receives migrants from MSAi, the percent of out-migration of MSAi which
goes to MSAk is multiplied by the per-household emissions for MSAk. This
9
is done for multiple years t. So for MSAi,t, the representative out-migration
city Ri,t is defined:
Ri,t =
∑
k
Migrationt MSAi to MSAk∑
lMigrationt MSAi to MSAl
∗Emissions(MSAk,t)∀l 6= i, k 6= i.
(6)
The representative out-migration city does not include the people who do
not move (k 6= i and l 6= i). For each MSAi,t, the net effect on national
emissions from out-migration is:
(Emissions(MSAi,t)−Emissions(Ri,t))∗
∑
kMigrationt(MSAitoMSAk)
for k 6= i,
which is the difference in emissions per household between the MSA and
its representative out-migration city times the number of households which
migrated out of that MSA. A second set of representative migration cities
is also constructed for in-migration. This represents the yearly flow carbon
footprint of all migrants who move to MSAi at year t. For MSAi, the
representative in-migration city RIN it is defined:
RINi,t =
∑
k
Migrationt MSAk to MSAi∑
lMigrationt MSAl to MSAi
∗Emissions(MSAk,t),∀l 6= i, k 6= i.
(7)
The net effect on national emissions from in-migration is:
(Emissions(RINi,t )−Emissions(MSAi,t))∗
∑
kMigrationtMSAktoMSAi
for k 6= i,
which is the difference in emissions per household between the represen-
tative in-migration city and the MSA times the number of households which
migrated into that MSA. There are two possible pairs of cities to use the
two-city model for. These two pairs will be analyzed to show the impact
10
on national emissions from migration to and from major metro areas in the
US.They can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Representative Migration Cities
Notes: The first pair represents out-migration, the households leaving a given MSA. The
second pair represents in-migrations, the households entering a given MSA.
1.3 Data
This section describes the data used in this paper. Migration data comes
from the IRS tax returns data. These are reported to the IRS as a change
in household address from year to year on the head of household tax return.
This data has both to and from city, and so gives flows for every county-to-
county pair in the US. These counties are aggregated up to the MSA level so
that moves in the data represent changes in labor markets rather than local
moves. Data for all MSA pairs in the US exists, though only those MSAs with
adequate emissions data are included in the analysis. As better emissions
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data becomes available, more MSAs can be added to the migration network
data. These data are a panel of one-way flows for years 1991-2010. Data
on energy use closely follows the methodology of Glaeser and Kahn (2010)
and Mangum (2017). The goal of this data is to assign per household carbon
emissions to each MSA in the analysis for each year in the time horizon. Data
for gasoline use comes from the National Highway Transportation Survey
(NHTS), which has 5 waves from 1983 until 2009. Total gallons per household
are calculated in the same way as Mangum (2017) by regressing gas usage on
location and time dummy variables, and then scaled for city household size
and proportion of households with personal vehicles obtained from public use
census files. This is to be able to use the average driving emissions of the city
household rather than the NHTS household. In-home energy use comes from
the Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS). The energy sources
used are fuel oil, natural gas, and electricity. The RECS has seven waves
from 1987-2009. Geographic data is relatively limited, including census sub-
region and metro status. Older homes are known to have higher energy use
than newer homes, so the average energy use tends to be higher than the
marginal new home energy use. However, newer homes are more often built
in the suburbs and are associated with higher gasoline consumption (Glaeser
and Kahn 2010). It is possible to distinguish between average energy use and
marginal energy use by restricting the sample to homes built in the last 20
years for marginal energy use.
With energy usage data assigned, it is now necessary to standardize en-
ergy use in terms of carbon emissions. Glaeser and Kahn (2010) assign 23.46
pounds per gallon of gasoline, 120.6 pounds per 1000 cubic feet of natural
12
gas, and 26.86 per gallon for fuel oil. Carbon content for electricity is deter-
mined by state using the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) carbon content per kilowatt hour. Now each MSA has a household
level average annual carbon emission for each year in the time horizon. For
a summary of assigned household carbon emissions at the MSA level over
time, see Table 8 in the Appendix.
Data for the Wharton Regulation Index is published online by the authors
of Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008). This data is used as an indicator
of strictness of housing regulations. This analysis is limited to more recent
years by the time limitations of the Wharton Index.
1.4 Results
This section details the estimates and results for the representative migra-
tion cities. The 49 largest U.S. MSA’s have their average household carbon
content, representative migration city, and total carbon content from migra-
tion calculated for the years 1992, 2000, and 2008. All estimates use the
top 49 largest metropolitan areas in the US. These are the cities which have
the best available data for emissions at the household and individual level.
First, all representative migration cities are calculated by taking the shares
of out-migration and multiplying by household level emissions. Table 1 in
the appendix details the findings for 2008. Each MSA is identified by nu-
meric MSA code and name. The second column is the population rank of
the MSA. Within the sample of cities, they are ranked on average popula-
tion between 1990 and 2010. The fourth column is the carbon emissions per
household of the MSA (origin city). This is for the city listed in the same
row. A household is calculated using a representative number of household
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members which is constant for all MSAs. The fifth column is the total num-
ber of households moving out of the MSA for 2008. Note that these only
include moves within the sample of MSAs. The sixth column is the per-
household carbon of the representative out-migration city (i.e. the aggregate
substitute to which migrants from the city are going to). For an out-migrant
from the row MSA chosen at random, this is the average new carbon per
household of the destination. For comparison, the seventh column shows
the per-household difference in carbon emissions between the representative
out-migration city and the MSA (Rep - MSA.) A positive number indicates
that the MSA has a lower carbon per household emission, and thus each out
migrant on net will add to national carbon emissions. The seventh column
shows the difference between the representative out-migration city and that
national average carbon emission (Rep - National Avg); a positive number
indicates that the out-migrants for that MSA are going to places with higher
than average carbon emissions, and a negative number indicated the out-
migrants are going to places with lower than average emissions. The last
column is the total carbon footprint for migration out of the MSA in mil-
lions of pounds, and the table is sorted by this value. The average net carbon
from out-migration is weighted by that MSA’s out migration to return a total
carbon footprint for all out migration for that year. Positive numbers show
that out-migration (caused by policy or any other reason) increases national
carbon emissions, and negative numbers show that out migration is instead
carbon reducing. The magnitudes are related to the total migration flows
and the other MSAs to which these flows are sent to; some specific cases are
discussed later. In Tables 2 and 3, this same layout is repeated for years 2000
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and 1992 to see how metropolitan areas and their representative migration
cities change over time. Note that carbon emissions for these calculations are
in terms of annual emissions added: a result of 10 million pounds means that
the migrants from that year add 10 million pounds of carbon to the national
emissions every year.
It is important to note that the calculations here are using carbon emis-
sion values for the average resident. Ideally, data would exist that allow
analysis of the marginal mover, in the case that the household moving from
city A to city B has consumption patterns different from the average of either
city. This analysis will assume that the average moving household had car-
bon emissions equal to the average of the origin city before moving and then
will have carbon emissions equal to the average of the destination city after
moving. It is possible that the movers do not represent the average emis-
sions; this could be the case either because of important differences in carbon
emissions from marginal uses (economies of scale in electricity generation, in-
creasing congestion from additional drivers, ect) or because the households
that move have important characteristics or retain patterns of energy con-
sumption. Glaser and Kahn (2010) use recent construction to try to get
closer to the marginal figure, though the occupants of recently constructed
homes are a combination of incumbent residents and new movers. Results
are generally robust and similar between the average household and those in
more recently constructed housing. Mangum (2017) finds that conditioning
on demographics, consumption patterns do not depend on the origin of the
household (they do not keep their habits from city A.) Having the analysis
following the average household is a limitation of not being able to identify
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movers and their energy consumption patterns.
What the tables show is that the MSAs with the largest footprint for
out-migration are those cities with relatively low household level emissions
for their region and large total outflows. Los Angeles is at the top of the
table for all three years, and for 2008 households leaving LA added over
700 million pounds of carbon emissions per year to the national footprint.
New York City and Philadelphia in the northeast, Chicago in the Midwest,
Miami in the Southeast, and Seattle in the Northwest all have similar roles
in the regions, though have a much smaller outflow and a lower household
emissions differential with their representative out-migration cities, and thus
a lower footprint. This is not always the case, however, and the migration
network plays a large role in carbon footprint from migration. For example,
Miami is ranked 5th in carbon footprint from out migration at 177 million
annual pounds per year, despite having almost identical household emissions
as Salt Lake City, which is ranked 19th in this table and is carbon saving in
out-migration. The difference lies in their relevant substitutes. Also notable
is that NYC started off in the middle of the pack in 1992, almost carbon
neutral, but has risen to the second highest footprint for leavers at over 477
million pounds of carbon in 2008.
The bottom of the table, occupied by those cities most carbon-saving
in out-migration, is occupied primarily by MSAs in the south. Atlanta,
Washington DC, Houston, and Dallas are all near the bottom, and thus
are carbon-saving from their out-migration. Oklahoma City, Boston, and
Las Vegas are also notable examples from other regions, though to a lesser
extent. Again it is interesting to see the role of the migration network at
16
play. Washington DC is a close second in terms of carbon saving from out-
migration, coming in at a 230 million annual pounds per year reduction,
even though it has lower per household emissions than San Antonio, which
is essentially carbon neutral in out-migration. Boston is an interesting case
because most of its representative out-migration city is New York City, and so
becomes grouped as a high-emission city due to its proximity and migration
flow relationship with one of the lowest-emission cities.
Next are the results for representative in-migration cities. This represents
the emissions for migrants to a city. High-emission cities have a high in-
migration footprint. The same tables are constructed for 2008, 2000, and
1992. Southern MSAs dominate the top of the list. The magnitudes have
changed but the regional pattern remains similar. Again NYC goes from
being an average footprint city in 1992 to a low-emission city in 2008.
Two-City Model
Attention is now turned to the two-city model. MSAs with the high-
est addition to the carbon footprint, either with a low carbon footprint for
leavers or a high carbon footprint for newcomers, are ones which would want
the highest housing regulations, all else equal, if the goal is reducing the
overall carbon footprint of the US. This would provide the most incentive for
households to migrate away from these high emissions MSAs and provide dis-
incentives for migrants to move to these MSAs. There can also be gains from
the intensive margin, as stricter zoning can reduce carbon emissions within
the city. Unfortunately, according the Wharton Regulation Index, the reality
is almost exactly the opposite. LA, which has far and away both the high-
est contribution to carbon footprint from out-migration and highest carbon
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footprint savings from in-migration, is the city with far and away the highest
Wharton index value, meaning it is the strictest on new housing development.
San Francisco, San Diego, Seattle, San Jose, NYC and Miami are all near the
top of the regulation list and the top in terms of their contribution from out-
migration to carbon footprint and savings from in-migration. Those MSAs
which are the most carbon-saving from out-migration and carbon-costing
from in-migration (standing to reduce emissions the most on the extensive
margin), Atlanta, Dallas, Washington DC, and Oklahoma City, are at the
very bottom of the Wharton index, meaning they are the most friendly to-
wards new housing development. This confirms the conjecture of Glaeser
and Kahn (2010). Regression results for Figure 2 are shown in Table 7 in the
appendix.
18
Figure 2: Wharton Regulation Index and Carbon from In-Migration
Notes: 1. The vertical axis shows MSA WRI, the horizontal axis shows millons of
pounds from in-migration.
2. WRI, a measure of land use regulations, comes from Gyourko et al 2008.
3. A negative relationship shows that more regulated MSAs have larger carbon savings
from in-migration.
4. Results significant at 0.05 level.
Next special attention is paid to both high-emission and low-emission
cities. The high-emission cities to be examined are Atlanta, Washington DC,
and San Antonio. These three are selected to show the differing influences
of migration flows and within-city carbon emissions on total footprints. In-
migration is considered for these cities. Los Angles is selected as the low-
emission city. Out-migration is considered for LA.
Atlanta, Georgia
Atlanta is a prototypical high-emission city by the known factors which
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increase per-household carbon emissions: It is located in the south, people
spend a lot of time driving, and people live in large houses. As noted in
Mangum (2017), Atlanta is near the top of MSAs in terms of carbon from in
home sources and from driving. In terms of migration flows, Atlanta was near
the top of the list in total households migrating to it (nearly 42,000 in 2008).
All of these factors combine to make Atlanta the dirtiest MSA in the country
in 2008 in terms of carbon emissions from in-migration. Note that when
discussing migration for a particular MSA, only the migration to and from the
top 49 MSAs are considered as a base. 10% of Atlanta’s in-migrants means
10% of the total in-migrants from the 48 other MSAs used for the sample.
For most cities in the sample, the top 48 other MSA’s constitute nearly all
of the migration flows. Where are the households moving to Atlanta coming
from? For 2008, about 17% of Atlanta’s in-migrants in the city sample come
from New York City, and about 14% come from Miami. After these two, no
other MSAs represent more than 5% of Atlanta’s in-migrants. The difference
in annual household carbon emissions for Atlanta and NYC is over 15,000
pounds per year; in other words, Atlanta households emit 50% more carbon
than NYC households. The difference in annual household carbon emissions
for Atlanta and Miami is over 12,000 pounds per year; households in Atlanta
emit around 36% more carbon than households in Miami. Accounting for just
over 30% of Atlanta’s in-migrants, NYC and Miami account for over 40% of
its carbon emissions from in-migration. So over 160 million pounds of annual
carbon emissions was added by movers from Miami and NYC to Atlanta in
2008. Los Angeles, with one of the lowest carbon emissions per household,
accounts for around 5% of Atlanta’s in-migration (1,900 households in 2008).
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L.A. accounts for over 10% of the carbon contribution from Atlanta’s in-
migration. The per-household carbon emissions in Atlanta is 93% higher
than in L.A., a gap of around 22,000 pounds per year. If L.A. were to send a
similar amount of households to Atlanta as NYC does, this would mean an
additional 5,000 households moving from L.A. to Atlanta and would increase
national annual carbon emissions by 110 million pounds. Figure 3 details
Atlanta’s in-migration in households for 2008, while Figure 4 details Atlanta’s
in-migration carbon contributions for 2008. Atlanta’s carbon contributions
from in-migration for 2000 and 1992 can be found in the appendix.
Figure 3: Atlanta Representative In-Migration City 2008
Notes: This chart shows the proportions of Atlanta’s in-migration in 2008. The
in-migration for Atlanta for 2008 is 41,318 households.
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Figure 4: Atlanta In-Migration Carbon Differentials, 2008
Notes: 1. The bars represent the difference between the destination (Atlanta) and the
sending MSA (i.e. New York City) in carbon emissions per household. A bar above zero
indicates a net increase in emissions from the move.
2. The gray line indicates the difference between the destination MSA and its average
in-migrant in 2008.
3. MSA’s are ordered by their migration share, largest to smallest left to right.
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Washington, D.C.
Washington DC has consistently contributed one of the highest carbon
totals from in-migration, despite being significantly cleaner in terms of car-
bon emissions per-household than other cities near the top of in-migration
footprint. In 2008 DC had a per household carbon emission of 38,375 pounds.
By comparison, Atlanta had a per-household carbon emission of over 45,500
pounds, and Dallas, Houston, Charlotte, and Austin, all cities near the top
of in-migration carbon footprint, all had per-household emissions between
42,000 and 45,000 pounds per year. Despite being lower emission than these
cities, Washington DC has a large in-carbon footprint because of its migra-
tion network, as shown in Figures 5 and 6. The biggest migration senders
to DC are Baltimore and NYC, and they have significantly lower emissions
per household (32,227 and 30,157 respectively.) This means that these two
channels of migration contribute more than half of DC’s in-migration carbon
footprint, adding 120 million pounds of carbon per year in 2008. Washington
DC’s carbon contributions from in-migration for 2000 and 1992 can be found
in the appendix.
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Figure 5: Washington D.C. Representative In-Migration City 2008
Notes: This chart shows the proportions of DC’s in-migration in 2008. The in-migration
for DC for 2008 is 53,623 households.
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Figure 6: Washington DC In-Migration Carbon Differentials, 2008
Notes: 1. The bars represent the difference between the destination (Washington D.C.)
and the sending MSA (i.e. Baltimore) in carbon emissions per household. A bar above
zero indicates a net increase in emissions from the move.
2. The gray line indicates the difference between the destination MSA and its average
in-migrant in 2008.
3. MSA’s are ordered by their migration share, largest to smallest left to right.
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San Antonio, TX
San Antonio is an interesting city and another example of the importance
of the interplay between migration network and per-household emissions. In
2008, San Antonio had a per-household emission of 39,994 pounds per year;
this is higher than that of Washington DC. However, the carbon footprint of
in-migration in San Antonio was only 40 million pounds per year, or about
17% of the footprint from in-migration for Washington DC. Its top 3 migra-
tion senders, Austin, Houston, and Dallas (see Figure 7) are all higher than
San Antonio in per-household emissions. The in-carbon footprint for these
cities is -25 million pounds per year for 2008. Relative to its Texas neigh-
bors, San Antonio is a low-emission city, and so is actually carbon-reducing
for these migrants. However, the carbon footprint for movers from Los An-
geles to San Antonio is around 21 million pounds per year, or over half of the
total net footprint for San Antonio’s in-movers. Riverside and San Diego are
also large contributors to the in-migration footprint, 9 million pounds per
year and 6 million pounds per year respectively, despite only being 3% each
of the total in-movers to San Antonio. San Antonio’s carbon contributions
from in-migration for 2000 and 1992 can be found in the appendix.
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Figure 7: San Antonio Representative In-Migration City 2008
Notes: This chart shows the proportions of San Antonio’s in-migration in 2008. The
in-migration for San Antonio for 2008 is 16,658 households.
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Figure 8: San Antonio In-Migration Carbon Differentials, 2008
Notes: 1. The bars represent the difference between the destination (San Antonio) and
the sending MSA (i.e. Austin) in carbon emissions per household. A bar above zero
indicates a net increase in emissions from the move.
2. The gray line indicates the difference between the destination MSA and its average
in-migrant in 2008.
3. MSA’s are ordered by their migration share, largest to smallest left to right.
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Los Angeles, California
L.A. is a low-emission city and contributes to carbon emissions through
out-migration. Thus the representative out-migration city will be used for
L.A. In 2008, L.A. had a per-household emission of 23,590 pounds per year,
one of the lowest in the country. Homes in Los Angeles don’t require much
cooling and heating, and the sources of electricity and heating are low carbon
in California. Each year 100,000 households migrate out of L.A., and the
destination cities have on average 6400 pounds per ear higher emissions per
household. The total annual carbon increase from out-migration for L.A. in
2008 was over 700 million pounds. Almost half of the out-migrants are to
other cities in California, mostly Riverside, San Diego, and San Francisco.
Only a small part of the total carbon footprint comes from these cities.
Destinations which receive a smaller portion of the out-migrants from L.A.,
such as Las Vegas, Phoenix, and Dallas, and Atlanta as we say previously,
all have very large carbon footprints. A small percent of L.A.’s migration is
still a very large number of households, and the increase in carbon emissions
can be nearly double.
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Figure 9: L.A. Out-Migration City 2008
Notes: This chart shows the proportions of LA’s out-migration in 2008. The
out-migration for LA for 2008 is 100,238 households.
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Figure 10: L.A. Out-Migration Carbon Differentials, 2008
Notes: 1. For Los Angeles, out-migration is considered. This is different from the
previous examples.
2. The bars represent the difference between the destination (i.e. Riverside) and the
sending MSA (LA) in carbon emissions per household. A bar above zero indicates a net
increase in emissions from the move.
3. The gray line indicates the difference between the average out migration city and the
origin MSA in 2008.
4. MSA’s are ordered by their migration share, largest to smallest left to right.
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between the intercity migration
network in the US and carbon emissions at the household level. It’s not
simply the case that some cities are cleaner than others in emissions, but
as people move from city to city, they affect the overall carbon output of
the country. Thus is it important to know not only the emissions levels
of cities, but also their relative position in the migration network and the
carbon emissions associated with migration. Certain cities, notably Atlanta
and Washington, DC are in a position where they receive many migrants
from other cities and have a high per-household emissions factor, and thus
growth in these cities increases total carbon output. Certain cities in a
large part of the migration network can vastly improve the national carbon
footprint by attracting people to migrate there from higher emission cities.
Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York City are particularly striking examples
of this phenomena, together reducing the annual national carbon footprint by
nearly one billion tons per year from in-migration. When it comes to policies
which can affect internal migration, we see from analysis using the Wharton
Regulation Index that current housing policies greatly add to national carbon
emissions on the extensive margin, since the places which are most carbon-
saving as destinations are those more heavily regulated than the cities which
are most carbon-saving as origins of movers. In the attempts to reduce
total national carbon footprint, the ultimate way to reduce the consequences
from climate change, it is clear that policies must be aimed at both the
household emissions margin and the migration flow margin. Attempting to
tax or regulate cities such as New York City or Los Angeles will cause a
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substantial increase in total national carbon from migration sources.
In 2018, a new regulation was passed in California which requires new
homes to be constructed with solar panels, with an increased construction
cost z1 estimated between $8,000 to $12,000 per house (Penn 2018). It was
passed by unanimous vote by the California Energy Commission with wide
public approval. While sure to provide some energy savings from solar energy,
the increase to an already regulated and expensive housing market is also sure
to have trade-offs not considered by the commission. The gains come in an
area which has the best climate and thus lowest need for in-home energy, and
replaces energy generated from among the lowest carbon-heavy sources in the
country. The increase in housing costs are sure to drive would-be movers and
some current residents to migrate elsewhere, and migrating out of California
cities will increase the national carbon footprint substantially (Glaeser and
Kahn 2010). Local policies passed on their “green merit” can in fact not be
green at all, and understanding these trade-offs in terms of energy use and
migration flows is the key to evaluating such policies now and in the future.
One way in which policies can be analyzed in the framework of this pa-
per is to consider the net migration effect and increase to carbon emissions
nationally through a ”ripple” effect. Starting with a change to city A, mi-
gration can be simulated to increase proportionally through the migration
network for city A. Then, a secondary effect or round would take place, with
each of this first group of cities sending additional migration through their
networks. Depending on the assumptions for number of rounds and strength
of the effect, this can simulate a migration counter-effect locally (1 round),
regionally (2-3 rounds) or nationally (large number of rounds). The assump-
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tions for how persistent and how strong each iteration would become can be
tested using exogenous events which triggers such a migration ripple (such
as major natural disasters.) A well calibrated model would thus be able to
analyze policies in terms of their migration and carbon effects based on place,
size of the policy, and assumed migration impact.
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Appendix
Notes for tables 1-3: 1. The first column contains population rank. 2.
MSA Carbon per Household is yearly carbon emissions in pounds. 3. Total
Outflow measuring the number households which moved out of the MSA.
4. Representative City Carbon per Household shows the weighted average
of carbon emissions for a household leaving the MSA, considering all of the
destinations and their migration flow. 5. Rep - MSA Carbon subtracts row 3
from row 5; it shows the per-household increase in emissions nationally from
out-migration for the MSA. 6. Rep - National Average Carbon shows the
difference between the representative out-migration city carbon emissions and
the national average emissions. 7. Total Rep Footprint is the total national
increase in carbon emissions, annually, from this MSA’s out migration (in
millions of pounds.)
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Table 1: Representative Out-Migration Cities 2008
Population
Rank
MSA
MSA Carbon
per HH
Total
Outflow
Rep. Carbon
per HH
Rep - MSA
Carbon per HH
Rep - National
Avg Carbon
Total Rep
Footprint
2 Los Angeles, CA 23,590 109,238 30,017 6,428 -5,935 702.1
1 New York, NY 30,158 101,943 34,842 4,684 -1,110 477.5
13 Riverside, CA 23,150 49,455 27,930 4,780 -2,228 236.4
12 San Francisco, CA 24,405 45,789 28,756 4,351 -7,196 199.2
6 Miami, FL 33,161 46,192 36,995 3,834 1,043 177.1
4 Philadelphia, PA 29,066 36,596 33,716 4,649 -2,236 170.1
17 San Diego, CA 26,449 40,138 30,407 3,958 -5,545 158.8
3 Chicago, IL 33,031 46,012 35,571 2,540 -381 116.9
15 Seattle, WA 26,857 22,055 32,104 5,247 -3,848 115.7
28 San Jose, CA 23,117 23,159 27,741 4,624 -8,211 107.1
19 Baltimore, MD 32,227 23,737 36,011 3,784 59 89.8
25 Portland, OR 25,706 11,392 30,935 5,229 -5,017 59.6
27 Sacramento, CA 26,098 17,035 27,728 1,630 -8,224 27.8
48 Rochester, NY 30,444 5,886 34,747 4,303 -1,205 25.3
35 Milwaukee, WI 32,052 7,405 35,240 3,188 -712 23.6
41 Buffalo, NY 32,397 6,255 34,684 2,287 -1,268 14.3
20 Pittsburgh, PA 34,623 9,832 35,177 554 -775 5.4
29 San Antonio, TX 39,994 13,591 39,332 -662 3,380 -9
49 Salt Lake City, UT 33,996 6,960 32,579 -1,417 -3,378 -9.9
45 Richmond, VA 38,578 7,286 37,170 -1,408 1,218 -10.3
16 Minneapolis, MN 34,886 13,273 34,050 -836 -1,902 -11.1
47 Birmingham, AL 43,932 3,210 40,088 -3,844 4,136 -12.3
31 Columbus, OH 38,984 10,895 37,479 -1,505 1,527 -16.4
21 Tampa, FL 37,470 22,602 36,608 -862 656 -19.5
44 Jacksonville, FL 39,529 10,649 37,060 -2,469 1,108 -26.3
42 Louisville, KY 45,956 3,812 38,892 -7,064 2,940 -26.9
43 Hartford, CT 38,308 7,181 34,455 -3,853 -1,497 -27.7
18 St Louis, MO 39,487 11,363 36,647 -2,840 695 -32.3
40 Memphis, TN 44,112 6,417 39,030 -5,082 3,078 -32.6
33 Norfolk, VA 38,759 15,498 36,527 -2,232 575 -34.6
32 Providence, RI 38,086 12,275 35,155 -2,931 -797 -36
22 Denver, CO 36,313 18,419 33,754 -2,559 -2,198 -47.1
38 Nashville, TN 46,342 6,734 38,373 -7,968 2,421 -53.7
23 Cleveland, OH 42,533 11,002 36,661 -5,872 709 -64.6
30 Orlando, FL 38,929 22,940 36,062 -2,867 110 -65.8
46 Oklahoma City, OK 51,257 5,122 38,367 -12,891 2,415 -66
34 Indianapolis, IN 45,666 7,530 36,672 -8,994 720 -67.7
37 Charlotte, NC 45,263 8,098 36,432 -8,832 480 -71.5
14 Phoenix, AZ 35,725 27,753 32,962 -2,763 -2,990 -76.7
36 Las Vegas, NV 35,465 20,901 31,665 -3,800 -4,287 -79.4
10 Boston, MA 36,172 34,315 33,832 -2,340 -2,120 -80.3
39 Austin, TX 43,617 16,194 38,500 -5,117 2,548 -82.9
24 Cincinnati, OH 47,185 8,766 37,506 -9,678 1,554 -84.8
26 Kansas City, MO 46,095 8,563 36,167 -9,928 215 -85
9 Detroit, MI 39,388 26,400 35,773 -3,615 -179 -95.4
8 Houston, TX 42,705 27,003 38,028 -4,677 2,076 -126.3
5 Dallas, TX 43,557 33,448 37,443 -6,114 1,491 -204.5
7 Washington, DC 38,376 55,166 34,201 -4,174 -1,751 -230.3
11 Atlanta, GA 45,556 27,493 35,748 -9,807 -204 -269.6
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Table 2: Representative Out-Migration Cities 2000
Population
Rank
MSA
MSA Carbon
per HH
Total
Outflow
Rep. Carbon
per HH
Rep - MSA
Carbon per HH
Rep - National
Avg Carbon
Total Rep
Footprint
2 Los Angeles, CA 23,672 102,128 30,147 6,475 -7,430 661.3
12 San Francisco, CA 25,123 51,813 29,768 4,645 -7,809 240.7
3 Chicago, IL 33,240 50,385 36,761 3,521 -816 177.4
13 Riverside, CA 23,721 36,008 28,038 4,317 -1,569 155.4
28 San Jose, CA 23,628 29,850 28,460 4,832 -9,117 144.2
17 San Diego, CA 27,056 36,214 30,916 3,860 -6,661 139.8
6 Miami, FL 32,810 24,211 38,359 5,549 782 134.3
15 Seattle, WA 28,130 23,859 32,908 4,778 -4,669 114
4 Philadelphia, PA 33,948 33,558 36,740 2,792 -837 93.7
19 Baltimore, MD 35,983 20,890 39,091 3,108 1,514 64.9
25 Portland, OR 27,380 12,885 31,580 4,200 -5,997 54.1
1 New York, NY 35,538 93,803 36,075 537 -1,502 50.4
27 Sacramento, CA 26,954 14,582 28,884 1,931 -8,693 28.2
35 Milwaukee, WI 32,964 7,220 36,128 3,165 -1,449 22.8
29 San Antonio, TX 40,852 13,502 41,472 620 3,895 8.4
48 Rochester, NY 36,486 5,951 37,573 1,087 -4 6.5
44 Jacksonville, FL 38,831 9,702 39,422 591 1,845 5.7
21 Tampa, FL 38,103 19,097 38,240 137 663 2.6
41 Buffalo, NY 38,538 6,616 37,828 -711 251 -4.7
47 Birmingham, AL 44,738 3,646 42,399 -2,339 4,822 -8.5
31 Columbus, OH 39,717 9,753 38,636 -1,080 1,059 -10.5
30 Orlando, FL 38,656 16,209 37,721 -935 144 -15.2
49 Salt Lake City, UT 35,132 8,630 33,316 -1,816 -4,261 -15.7
18 St Louis, MO 39,294 11,714 37,670 -1,623 93 -19
45 Richmond, VA 43,332 6,487 40,227 -3,106 2,650 -20.1
42 Louisville, KY 46,570 3,931 39,917 -6,653 2,340 -26.2
43 Hartford, CT 41,096 6,720 36,959 -4,136 -618 -27.8
40 Memphis, TN 44,874 6,360 40,420 -4,454 2,843 -28.3
32 Providence, RI 40,250 9,966 36,990 -3,261 -587 -32.5
23 Cleveland, OH 40,964 10,700 37,774 -3,190 197 -34.1
14 Phoenix, AZ 35,565 24,375 34,089 -1,476 -3,488 -36
20 Pittsburgh, PA 41,052 10,992 37,683 -3,368 106 -37
36 Las Vegas, NV 35,249 13,893 32,398 -2,851 -5,179 -39.6
9 Detroit, MI 38,937 18,745 36,783 -2,154 -794 -40.4
33 Norfolk, VA 42,412 13,608 39,218 -3,193 1,641 -43.5
16 Minneapolis, MN 38,930 12,392 35,054 -3,876 -2,523 -48
22 Denver, CO 37,685 19,599 35,053 -2,632 -2,524 -51.6
34 Indianapolis, IN 45,138 7,355 37,832 -7,305 255 -53.7
38 Nashville, TN 48,283 6,735 40,043 -8,240 2,466 -55.5
10 Boston, MA 37,831 33,616 36,110 -1,721 -1,467 -57.9
37 Charlotte, NC 47,916 6,845 39,146 -8,770 1,569 -60
24 Cincinnati, OH 46,174 8,635 38,337 -7,837 760 -67.7
26 Kansas City, MO 45,486 8,831 37,655 -7,831 78 -69.2
39 Austin, TX 45,354 13,734 39,799 -5,555 2,222 -76.3
46 Oklahoma City, OK 53,785 5,706 40,043 -13,742 2,466 -78.4
8 Houston, TX 44,225 28,068 39,670 -4,555 2,093 -127.8
5 Dallas, TX 45,104 34,101 38,973 -6,131 1,396 -209.1
11 Atlanta, GA 48,299 24,888 37,517 -10,782 -60 -268.3
7 Washington, DC 42,371 47,770 36,341 -6,031 -1,236 -288.1
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Table 3: Representative Out-Migration Cities 1992
Population
Rank
MSA
MSA Carbon
per HH
Total
Outflow
Rep. Carbon
per HH
Rep - MSA
Carbon per HH
Rep - National
Avg Carbon
Total Rep
Footprint
2 Los Angeles, CA 24,625 115,531 29,995 5,371 -6,169 620.5
12 San Francisco, CA 26,068 45,045 29,714 3,646 -6,450 164.2
4 Philadelphia, PA 30,237 30,800 35,298 5,061 -866 155.9
3 Chicago, IL 32,103 39,249 35,409 3,306 -755 129.7
13 Riverside, CA 24,907 36,439 28,394 3,487 -7,770 127
17 San Diego, CA 27,559 36,552 30,777 3,219 -5,387 117.6
6 Miami, FL 31,149 19,535 36,549 5,400 385 105.5
28 San Jose, CA 24,802 24,014 28,836 4,033 -7,328 96.9
19 Baltimore, MD 34,354 17,642 37,670 3,316 1,506 58.5
15 Seattle, WA 28,307 6,167 33,491 5,185 -2,673 32
25 Portland, OR 27,693 8,052 30,698 3,005 -5,466 24.2
29 San Antonio, TX 38,151 11,071 39,979 1,828 3,815 20.2
35 Milwaukee, WI 31,387 5,902 34,734 3,347 -1,430 19.8
27 Sacramento, CA 27,664 14,034 29,016 1,352 -7, 148 19
44 Jacksonville, FL 35,516 8,069 37,453 1,937 1,289 15.6
21 Tampa, FL 35,903 18,293 36,482 579 318 10.6
48 Rochester, NY 33,453 4,777 35,281 1,828 -883 8.7
1 New York, NY 34,097 89,247 34,176 79 -1,988 7.1
20 Pittsburgh, PA 35,643 8,927 35,910 267 -254 2.4
41 Buffalo, NY 34,908 5,401 35,303 394 -861 2.1
18 St Louis, MO 36,502 11,220 36,495 -8 331 -0.1
31 Columbus, OH 37,131 7,412 37,081 -50 917 -0.4
30 Orlando, FL 36,272 13,465 36,226 -47 62 -0.6
49 Salt Lake City, UT 33,587 5,363 32,721 -866 -3,443 -4.6
14 Phoenix, AZ 33,507 19,487 33,171 -336 -2,993 -6.5
36 Las Vegas, NV 33,493 9,568 32,439 -1,054 -3,725 -10.1
47 Birmingham, AL 43,758 2,898 39,874 -3,883 3,710 -11.3
45 Richmond, VA 41,107 5,249 38,508 -2,600 2,344 -13.6
9 Detroit, MI 36,265 17,614 35,392 -872 -772 -15.4
23 Cleveland, OH 37,987 8,729 35,924 -2,063 -240 -18
33 Norfolk, VA 39,559 8,347 37,309 -2,250 1,145 -18.8
42 Louisville, KY 44,432 3,206 38,238 -6,195 2,0714 -19.9
37 Charlotte, NC 44,591 4,580 38,050 -6,541 1,886 -30
40 Memphis, TN 43,314 6,178 38,439 -4,875 2,275 -30.1
34 Indianapolis, IN 41,479 5,873 36,326 -5,154 162 -30.3
32 Providence, RI 39,772 10,069 35,979 -3,793 -185 -38.2
26 Kansas City, MO 42,434 7,219 36,884 -5,550 720 -40.1
43 Hartford, CT 40,610 7,685 35,359 -5,251 -805 -40.4
16 Minneapolis, MN 38,208 9,845 34,094 -4,114 -2,070 -40.5
38 Nashville, TN 47,354 4,889 38,798 -8,556 2,634 -41.8
24 Cincinnati, OH 42,737 7,487 36,830 -5,907 666 -44.2
39 Austin, TX 44,361 10,267 39,560 -4,801 3,396 -49.3
46 Oklahoma City, OK 52,115 4,986 38,691 -13,424 2,527 -66.9
22 Denver, CO 38,768 15,377 34,170 -4,598 -1,994 -70.7
10 Boston, MA 37,557 31,490 34,877 -2,681 -1,287 -84.4
8 Houston, TX 43,611 23,082 38,308 -5,303 2,144 -122.4
11 Atlanta, GA 45,992 18,221 36,669 -9,323 505 -169.9
5 Dallas, TX 44,870 31,000 37,958 -6,913 1,794 -214.3
7 Washington, DC 41,133 44,419 35,156 -5,978 -1,008 -265.5
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Notes for tables 4-6: 1. The first column contains population rank. 2.
MSA Carbon per Household is yearly carbon emissions in pounds. 3. Total
Inflow measuring the number households which moved into the MSA. 4. In-
Rep Carbon per Household shows the weighted average of carbon emissions
for a household entering the MSA, considering all of the origins and their
migration flow. 5. MSA - In-Rep Carbon subtracts row 3 from row 5; it shows
the per-household increase in emissions nationally from in-migration for the
MSA. 6. Rep - National Average Carbon shows the difference between the
representative in-migration city carbon emissions and the national average
emissions. 7. Total Rep Footprint is the total national increase in carbon
emissions, annually, from this MSA’s in migration (in millions of pounds.)
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Table 4: Representative In-Migration Cities 2008
Population
Rank
MSA
MSA Carbon
per HH
Total
Inflow
In-Rep. Carbon
per HH
MSA - In-Rep.
Carbon per HH
Rep - National
Avg Carbon
Total Rep
Footprint
11 Atlanta, GA 45,556 41,318 35,119 10,437 -833 431.2
5 Dallas, TX 43,557 41,747 36,479 7,078 527 295.5
7 Washington, DC 38,376 53,623 34,096 4,279 -1,856 229.5
8 Houston, TX 42,705 35,046 36,695 6,010 743 210.6
37 Charlotte, NC 45,263 17,572 34,981 10,282 -971 180.7
39 Austin, TX 43,617 22,842 37,367 6,250 1,415 142.8
14 Phoenix, AZ 35,725 37,435 32,311 3,414 -3,641 127.8
36 Las Vegas, NV 35,465 27,821 30,895 4,570 -5,057 127.1
30 Orlando, FL 38,929 25,035 35,033 3,896 -919 97.5
38 Nashville, TN 46,342 9,626 37,750 8,592 1,798 82.7
34 Indianapolis, IN 45,666 8,066 35,984 9,682 32 78.1
26 Kansas City, MO 46,095 7,401 35,894 10,201 -58 75.5
24 Cincinnati, OH 47,185 7,092 37,406 9,779 1,454 69.3
46 Oklahoma City, OK 51,257 4,670 37,309 13,949 1,357 65.1
22 Denver, CO 36,313 24,371 33,706 2,607 -2,246 63.5
10 Boston, MA 36,172 30,893 34,162 2,010 -1,790 62.1
9 Detroit, MI 39,388 11,627 35,277 4,111 -675 47.8
21 Tampa, FL 37,470 26,098 35,761 1,709 -191 44.6
23 Cleveland, OH 42,533 6,785 36,394 6,139 442 41.7
33 Norfolk, VA 38,759 12,804 35,605 3,154 -347 40.4
29 San Antonio, TX 39,994 16,658 37,582 2,413 1,630 40.2
44 Jacksonville, FL 39,529 12,441 36,365 3,165 413 39.4
40 Memphis, TN 44,112 5,111 38,040 6,072 2,088 31
42 Louisville, KY 45,956 4,003 38,520 7,435 2,568 29.8
32 Providence, RI 38,086 9,840 35,075 3,011 -877 29.6
18 St Louis, MO 39,487 8,939 36,775 2,712 823 24.2
49 Salt Lake City, UT 33,996 8,601 31,376 2,621 -4,576 22.5
43 Hartford, CT 38,308 5,221 34,059 4,249 -1,893 22.2
45 Richmond, VA 38,578 8,885 36,581 1,997 629 17.7
47 Birmingham, AL 43,932 3,211 39,367 4,565 3,415 14.7
31 Columbus, OH 38,984 9,894 37,972 1,012 2,020 10
16 Minneapolis, MN 34,886 10,632 34,373 513 -1,579 5.5
20 Pittsburgh, PA 34,623 7,492 34,995 -372 -957 -2.8
41 Buffalo, NY 32,397 4,170 33,869 -1,471 -2,083 -6.1
48 Rochester, NY 30,444 3,726 33,780 -3,336 -2,172 -12.4
35 Milwaukee, WI 32,052 5,581 34,714 -2,662 -1,238 -14.9
27 Sacramento, CA 26,098 17,925 27,137 -1,039 -8,815 -18.6
25 Portland, OR 25,706 15,843 30,596 -4,890 -5,356 -77.5
6 Miami, FL 33,161 39,352 35,193 -2,032 -759 -80
19 Baltimore, MD 32,227 24,569 36,155 -3,927 203 -96.5
3 Chicago, IL 33,031 40,844 35,914 -2,883 -38 -117.8
28 San Jose, CA 23,117 23,176 28,393 -5,276 -7,559 -122.3
4 Philadelphia, PA 29,066 33,519 33,132 -4,065 -2,820 -136.3
17 San Diego, CA 26,449 39,192 30,058 -3,608 -5,894 -141.4
15 Seattle, WA 26,857 27,109 32,264 -5,406 -3,688 -146.6
13 Riverside, CA 23,150 53,307 26,295 -3,144 -9,657 -167.6
12 San Francisco, CA 24,405 50,554 28,897 -4,492 -7,055 -227.1
1 New York, NY 30,158 82,814 34,172 -4,014 -1,780 -332.4
2 Los Angeles, CA 23,590 88,497 29,804 -6,214 -6,148 -549.9
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Table 5: Representative In-Migration Cities 2000
Population
Rank
MSA
MSA Carbon
per HH
Total
Inflow
In-Rep. Carbon
per HH
MSA - In-Rep.
Carbon per HH
Rep - National
Avg Carbon
Total Rep
Footprint
11 Atlanta, GA 48,299 36,598 37,755 10,545 178 385.9
7 Washington, DC 42,371 49,977 36,710 5,661 -867 282.9
5 Dallas, TX 45,104 35,654 38,949 6,155 1,372 219.4
8 Houston, TX 44,225 24,862 39,153 5,072 1,576 126.1
37 Charlotte, NC 47,916 10,919 38,467 9,449 890 103.2
36 Las Vegas, NV 35,249 25,680 31,234 4,015 -6,343 103.1
39 Austin, TX 45,354 19,972 40,207 5,148 2,630 102.8
38 Nashville, TN 48,283 7,523 39,855 8,428 2,278 63.4
46 Oklahoma City, OK 53,785 4,177 38,757 15,029 1,180 62.8
22 Denver, CO 37,685 26,711 35,356 2,330 -2,221 62.2
26 Kansas City, MO 45,486 7,627 37,584 7,902 7 60.3
33 Norfolk, VA 42,412 13,047 37,880 4,532 303 59.1
34 Indianapolis, IN 45,138 7,459 37,454 7,683 -123 57.3
14 Phoenix, AZ 35,565 33,918 33,887 1,678 -3,690 56.9
24 Cincinnati, OH 46,174 7,182 38,713 7,461 1,136 53.6
16 Minneapolis, MN 38,930 11,487 35,195 3,735 -2,382 42.9
10 Boston, MA 37,831 29,852 36,503 1,328 -1,074 39.7
32 Providence, RI 40,250 10,957 37,019 3,231 -558 35.4
9 Detroit, MI 38,937 14,931 36,900 2,037 -677 30.4
40 Memphis, TN 44,874 5,512 39,506 5,368 1,929 29.6
30 Orlando, FL 38,656 21,157 37,271 1,385 -306 29.3
43 Hartford, CT 41,096 5,420 36,318 4,778 -1,259 25.9
45 Richmond, VA 43,332 7,259 39,859 3,473 2,282 25.2
20 Pittsburgh, PA 41,052 6,759 37,366 3,686 -211 24.9
42 Louisville, KY 46,570 3,703 39,876 6,694 2,299 24.8
23 Cleveland, OH 40,964 7,050 37,996 2,969 419 20.9
49 Salt Lake City, UT 35,132 7,032 32,294 2,837 -5,283 20
18 St Louis, MO 39,294 9,010 37,870 1,424 293 12.8
47 Birmingham, AL 44,738 2,858 41,112 3,627 3,535 10.4
29 San Antonio, TX 40,852 12,188 40,196 656 2,619 8
41 Buffalo, NY 38,538 3,346 36,880 1,659 -697 5.5
31 Columbus, OH 39,717 9,607 39,219 497 1,642 4.8
21 Tampa, FL 38,103 25,313 37,973 130 396 3.3
44 Jacksonville, FL 38,831 9,907 38,541 290 964 2.9
48 Rochester, NY 36,486 3,740 37,135 -649 -442 -2.4
27 Sacramento, CA 26,954 20,204 27,304 -350 -10,273 -7.1
35 Milwaukee, WI 32,964 5,485 35,561 -2,598 -2,016 -14.2
1 New York, NY 35,538 62,580 35,973 -435 -1,604 -27.2
25 Portland, OR 27,380 13,348 31,677 -4,297 -5,900 -57.4
19 Baltimore, MD 35,983 22,702 39,495 -3,512 1,918 -79.7
4 Philadelphia, PA 33,948 29,970 36,673 -2,726 -904 -81.7
15 Seattle, WA 28,130 23,688 33,150 -5,020 -4,427 -118.9
13 Riverside, CA 23,721 50,652 26,386 -2,665 -11,191 -135
3 Chicago, IL 33,240 36,288 37,256 -4,016 -321 -145.7
17 San Diego, CA 27,056 38,602 30,900 -3,844 -6,677 -148.4
28 San Jose, CA 23,628 26,082 29,500 -5,872 -8,077 -153.1
6 Miami, FL 32,810 41,102 37,260 -4,449 -317 -182.9
12 San Francisco, CA 25,123 57,726 30,190 -5,067 -7,387 -292.5
2 Los Angeles, CA 23,672 79,455 31,169 -7,497 -6,408 -595.7
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Table 6: Representative In-Migration Cities 1992
Population
Rank
MSA
MSA Carbon
per HH
Total
Inflow
In-Rep. Carbon
per HH
MSA - In-Rep.
Carbon per HH
Rep - National
Avg Carbon
Total Rep
Footprint
11 Atlanta, GA 45,992 29,387 36,075 9,917 -89 291.4
7 Washington, DC 41,133 41,416 34,910 6,223 -1,254 257.7
5 Dallas, TX 44,870 30,029 37,616 7,254 1,452 217.8
8 Houston, TX 43,611 26,508 37,822 5,789 1,658 153.5
22 Denver, CO 38,768 23,025 33,756 5,012 -2,408 115.4
39 Austin, TX 44,361 13,417 39,261 5,100 3,097 68.4
46 Oklahoma City, OK 52,115 4,478 37,375 14,740 1,211 66
38 Nashville, TN 47,354 6,665 37,841 9,513 1,677 63.4
37 Charlotte, NC 44,591 7,039 36,478 8,113 314 57.1
24 Cincinnati, OH 42,737 7,419 36,348 6,389 184 47.4
33 Norfolk, VA 39,559 14,068 36,346 3,213 182 45.2
36 Las Vegas, NV 33,493 17,260 31,006 2,487 -5,158 42.9
26 Kansas City, MO 42,434 6,726 36,223 6,211 59 41.8
16 Minneapolis, MN 38,208 10,233 34,172 4,036 -1,992 41.3
10 Boston, MA 37,557 20,499 35,548 2,009 -616 41.2
34 Indianapolis, IN 41,479 6,614 35,963 5,517 -201 36.5
40 Memphis, TN 43,314 5,532 37,547 5,767 1,383 31.9
32 Providence, RI 39,772 7,979 36,364 3,408 200 27.2
42 Louisville, KY 44,432 3,523 37,671 6,762 1,507 23.8
43 Hartford, CT 40,610 4,139 35,237 5,373 -927 22.2
14 Phoenix, AZ 33,507 25,012 32,680 828 -3,484 20.7
45 Richmond, VA 41,107 6,058 37,865 3,242 1,701 19.6
23 Cleveland, OH 37,987 7,001 35,622 2,366 -542 16.6
47 Birmingham, AL 43,758 3,071 39,058 4,699 2,894 14.4
9 Detroit, MI 36,265 11,934 35,069 1,196 -1.095 14.3
49 Salt Lake City, UT 33,587 6,814 31,513 2,074 -1,095 14.1
30 Orlando, FL 36,272 18,060 35,603 669 -561 12.1
20 Pittsburgh, PA 35,643 8,040 35,292 351 -872 2.8
18 St Louis, MO 36,502 8,219 36,207 295 43 2.4
41 Buffalo, NY 34,908 4,050 34,455 454 -1,709 1.8
31 Columbus, OH 37,131 8,183 37,024 107 860 0.9
21 Tampa, FL 35,903 24,655 35,950 -46 -214 -1.1
1 New York, NY 34,097 43,813 34,166 -69 -1,998 -3
27 Sacramento, CA 27,664 17,685 27,832 -169 -8,332 -3
48 Rochester, NY 33,453 4,074 35,108 -1,654 -1,056 -6.7
29 San Antonio, TX 38,151 11,277 39,034 -883 2,870 -10
44 Jacksonville, FL 35,516 9,623 36,865 -1,349 701 -13
35 Milwaukee, WI 31,387 5,337 34,258 -2,871 -1,906 -15.3
25 Portland, OR 27,693 11,464 30,433 -2,740 -5,731 -31.4
19 Baltimore, MD 34,354 19,850 38,139 -3,786 1,975 -75.1
13 Riverside, CA 24,907 53,015 26,481 -1,574 -9,683 -83.4
28 San Jose, CA 24,802 21,242 28,944 -4,142 -7,220 -88
15 Seattle, WA 28,307 24,973 31,948 -3,641 -4,216 -90.9
17 San Diego, CA 27,559 37,181 30,014 -2,455 -6,150 -91.3
3 Chicago, IL 32,103 32,733 35,338 -3,235 -826 -105.9
4 Philadelphia, PA 30,237 25,575 35,076 -4,839 -1,088 -123.8
12 San Francisco, CA 26,068 46,649 29,727 -3,659 -6,437 -170.7
6 Miami, FL 31,149 42,064 35,363 -4,214 -801 -177.2
2 Los Angeles, CA 24,625 76,364 30,946 -6,321 -5,218 -482.7
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Table 7: Regression Results for Wharton Regulation Index
Variable Estimate
Representative City
Carbon Footprint
(Millions of lbs)
-0.0014***
(0.00064)
Constant
0.2173
(0.10193)
Adj. R-Squared 0.0769
Observations 44
Figure 11: Washington D.C. In-Representative Carbon Differential, 2000
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Table 8: Summary of Assigned Carbon Per Household
Population Rank MSA Carbon per HH 1992 Carbon per HH 2000 Carbon per HH 2008 Carbon per HH 2008-1992
1 New York, NY 34,097 35,538 30,158 -3,939
16 Minneapolis, MN 38,208 38,930 34,886 -3,322
48 Rochester, NY 33,453 36,486 30,444 -3,010
7 Washington, DC 41,133 42,371 38,376 -2,758
45 Richmond, VA 41,107 43,332 38,578 -2,529
41 Buffalo, NY 34,908 38,538 32,397 -2,511
22 Denver, CO 38,768 37,685 36,313 -2,455
43 Hartford, CT 40,610 41,096 38,308 -2,302
19 Baltimore, MD 34,354 35,983 32,227 -2,126
25 Portland, OR 27,693 27,380 25,706 -1,987
13 Riverside, CA 24,907 23,721 23,150 -1,757
32 Providence, RI 39,772 40,250 38,086 -1,686
28 San Jose, CA 24,802 23,628 23,117 -1,686
12 San Francisco, CA 26,068 25,123 24,405 -1,663
27 Sacramento, CA 27,664 26,954 26,098 -1,565
15 Seattle, WA 28,307 28,130 26,857 -1,449
10 Boston, MA 37,557 37,831 36,172 -1,385
5 Dallas, TX 44,870 45,104 43,557 -1,313
4 Philadelphia, PA 30,237 33,948 29,066 -1,171
17 San Diego, CA 27,559 27,056 26,449 -1,109
2 Los Angeles, CA 24,625 23,672 23,590 -1,035
20 Pittsburgh, PA 35,643 41,052 34,623 -1,020
38 Nashville, TN 47,354 48,283 46,342 -1,012
8 Houston, TX 43,611 44,225 42,705 -906
46 Oklahoma City, OK 52,115 53,785 51,257 -858
33 Norfolk, VA 39,559 42,412 38,759 -800
39 Austin, TX 44,361 45,354 43,617 -744
11 Atlanta, GA 45,992 48,299 45,556 -436
47 Birmingham, AL 43,758 44,738 43,932 175
49 Salt Lake City, UT 33,587 35,132 33,996 409
35 Milwaukee, WI 31,387 32,964 32,052 665
37 Charlotte, NC 44,591 47,916 45,263 672
40 Memphis, TN 43,314 44,874 44,112 798
3 Chicago, IL 32,103 33,240 33,031 928
42 Louisville, KY 44,432 46,570 45,956 1,523
21 Tampa, FL 35,903 38,103 37,470 1,567
29 San Antonio, TX 38,151 40,852 39,994 1,844
31 Columbus, OH 37,131 39,717 38,984 1,853
36 Las Vegas, NV 33,493 35,249 35,465 1,972
6 Miami, FL 31,149 32,810 33,161 2,012
14 Phoenix, AZ 33,507 35,565 35,725 2,218
30 Orlando, FL 36,272 38,656 38,929 2,657
18 St Louis, MO 36,502 39,294 39,487 2,985
9 Detroit, MI 36,265 38,937 39,388 3,123
26 Kansas City, MO 42,434 45,486 46,095 3,661
44 Jacksonville, FL 35,516 38,831 39,529 4,013
34 Indianapolis, IN 41,479 45,138 45,666 4,187
24 Cincinnati, OH 42,737 46,174 47,185 4,448
23 Cleveland, OH 37,987 40,964 42,533 4,545
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Figure 12: Washington D.C. In-Representative Carbon Differential, 1992
Figure 13: San Antonio In-Representative Carbon Differential, 2000
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Figure 14: San Antonio In-Representative Carbon Differential, 1992
Figure 15: Atlanta In-Representative Carbon Differential, 2000
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Figure 16: Atlanta In-Representative Carbon Differential, 1992
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2. Accurate Assignment of School Quality to Properties
2.1 Introduction
One of the important factors a family considers when deciding to purchase
a house is the quality of the local schools. These decisions by households
can shape not only the composition of students at a school, but also the
socio-demographic composition of a neighborhood. A recent study by Owens
(2016) has shown that families with children account for the entire increase
in income segregation from 1990-2010, showing that households will shape
the places they choose to live in. As noted in Kornrich and Furstenberg
(2012), there is a large “class gap” in investments in children among families.
One such investment parents make in their children is purchasing houses in
neighborhoods with high-quality schools, and this bidding-up of good-school
housing will cause income segregation and ultimately lead to larger differences
by family income of child education attainment. School quality is seen as a
very important input from parents to children, and has been shown to be
a key component of the intergenerational transmission of advantage as seen
in Chetty et. al (2011). School quality has also been shown to have a large
impact on earnings outcomes.
The standard procedure to measure the value of good schools is to mea-
sure how much more households pay to live in areas with these good schools.
Studies of household ”demand” for education often rely on property values to
infer willingness to pay (Black 1999; Sieg et al. 2004; Figlio and Lucas 2004;
Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan 2007; Clapp, Nanda, and Ross 2008; Fack and
Grenet 2010; Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger 2011; Brunner, Cho, and Reback
2012; Andreyeva and Patrick 2017; Mothorpe 2018; Banzhaf and Mangum
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2018). However, obtaining data on exactly which school a given property
is assigned to is not a simple problem, but one which is a prerequisite to
drawing inferences about the importance of school quality. Accurate school
assignment data is not widely available for many areas and many years, and
therefore various methods are used to make this assignment. The most rele-
vant consideration for the purposes of this paper is the method of matching
used in prior work. Card and Krueger (1992) study education differences by
making comparisons across states, aggregating many variables to the school
district or state level and then assigning these means to properties. As we will
see, districts are very different in size, number of schools and students, and
other demographics. Sandra Black (1999) was the first major study which
attempts to solve the problem of endogeniety of good schools being located
in otherwise highly desirable areas. She uses attendance boundary data in
Massachusetts and compares houses on either side of these attendance lines.
Downes and Zabel (2002) use distance as the crow flies to assign properties
to the closest school in the Chicago MSA. Fack and Grenet (2010) utilize
attendance boundary data for secondary schools, but only for one european
city (Paris).
The purpose of this paper is to compare methods of assigning school
quality to a property. These methods include those from prior studies and
ones introduced in this paper. Two new data sets, known as SABINS and
SABS, allow for a much more accurate match and much larger sample size
than any previous studies on school attendance. This data will be used as
a comparison to test various matching methods used in prior research, and
to determine the methods’ accuracy in assigning the proper school quality
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to a particular property. The extent to which matching by these methods
is accurate or inaccurate affects hedonic estimates of school quality on the
price of homes. If prior studies used methods of matching which are largely
inaccurate, then their estimates and policy implications could be flawed. I
also test several new methods to see if they can improve the matching quality.
Then I turn to the question of how significant the problem of miss-matching
is. Finally, I explore the policy implications of failing to accurately value
school quality. This paper contributes to the literature by directly testing
methods used in previous research. It is an open question just how accurate
some of these methods are, and if their accuracy is the same for different
areas of the U.S. By extending these methods for a much larger sample, both
by schools and areas of the U.S., this paper can test both the internal validity
of the method within its sample and its external validity for other parts of
the country. In the future, studies about the value of education will always
be concerned with the accuracy of matching properties to schools, so this
paper will be able to contribute to future studies as well.
In summary, assignment by distance and by aggregate district level means
often leads to matching errors. These errors vary over different areas in the
US. They also vary by the size of the district. Assignment of school qual-
ity such as student teacher ratio, free and reduced lunch proportion, and
test scores show that the methods are mismatching the key components of
school quality. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the various
methods of school quality assignment and how they relate to prior research.
Section 3 describes the data sets used throughout the paper. Section 4 pro-
vides analysis on the accuracy of the school quality assignment methods.
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Second 5 provides insight on the magnitude of bias mismatching can have on
studies which examine school quality. Section 6 concludes and outlines the
plan for future research.
2.2 School Quality Assignment Methods
This section describes in detail methods used to assign school quality
to a housing bundle. All assignments are done at the census block level so
property data can be matched by its census block.
Attendance Boundary Administrative Data
The baseline way in which other matching will be compared is to match
properties using GIS files of school attendance boundaries, provided by school
administrators. These are attendance boundaries for individual schools within
a school district. These data come from SABINS/SABS, and blocks are as-
signed to the school which corresponds to the attendance boundary they lie
in. More details on SABINS and SABS are provided in section 3. Previous
studies of local areas have used attendance boundary data and thus a direct
matching from schools to blocks or properties. For example, Black (1999)
does this for three areas in Massachusetts; Bayer, Ferreira and McMillian
(2007) use attendance boundary data for some parts of the San Francisco
area. However, until recently, such data was not available for large geo-
graphic scopes in the US.
Distance Proximity
One intuitive method for assigning schools to properties is to assign the
geographically nearest school. Taking the latitude and longitude of both
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schools and properties (blocks), a distance is calculated and then the match-
ing is made with the minimum distance(s) from the property (or block) to
the school. A constraint can be added that the match must be within the
school district, the boundaries of which are more easily observed. This is the
method of school quality assignment that was used at the census tract scale
by Downes and Zabel (2002).
Some concerns naturally arise when matching by distance. The matching
will depend on the exclusion of atypical schools, such as charter schools or
private schools. Distance ”as the crow flies” may not represent the short-
est travel time in some areas, such as those with rivers, lakes, and variance
in elevation. School district boundaries are often explicitly set with travel
time in mind, and thus any geographic features which cause travel time and
straight line distance to differ will be a cause for concern (Hoxby, 2000.) Con-
sequently, the distance matching method might produce more mismatching
in areas which have more geographic features, such as rivers and mountains.
A measure such as the geographic fragmentation index, which quantifies the
likelihood that two people selected at random live at different elevations,
could be a covariate of this matching efficiency. The U.S. Geological Survey
contains data on small streams which could be another covariate of match-
ing efficiency. Also, distance matching assumes fairly regular and logical
planning of school locations and that these are consistent between different
districts across the country. It also assumes new schools to have surrounding
areas attend them according to distance. For the distance calculations in
this paper, census blocks are matched to all of the schools within the school
district and state containing the block, and schools are then ranked for each
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census block by distance. When merged with data from SABINS and SABS,
this allows a comparison to be made for the match of nearest school, second
nearest school, ect. Knowing this distribution of correct match by distance
rank can be useful when the distance-weighted measure is considered.
District Means
Another method used in prior literature is assigning each block to its
school district rather than its school. Equivalently, it assigns a school qual-
ity equal to an aggregated measure of all schools in that district. Examples
of this approach include Card and Kruger (1992) and Sieg et al. (2004).
This method has the lowest burden of school quality data, needing only
district boundaries (which are more fixed than attendance zones) and ag-
gregated school quality measures, which are widely available. However, it
can only be used to make comparisons and measure capitalization between
districts. School districts can vary drastically in size, population, and num-
ber of schools. Other policies and other neighborhood quality will also vary
between different districts.
Rank Weighted Quality
The last method is to assign school quality by a convex combination of
several nearby schools. Using results from a distance proximity matching
method, it is possible to assign rank weighted school quality values to a
given block. This is analogous to work commonly done with air quality
monitors, using distance to monitors (in our case, distance to schools) to
assign weighted pollution (school quality) measures.
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In a universe where it is difficult to determine the exact school of atten-
dance for a given block, this method could be a reasonable compromise in
the attempt to accurately measure school quality. Moreover, in areas where
attendance to the assigned school is not mandatory, this measure could ac-
tually be more representative of the choices the household faces. Certain
programs, such as school vouchers, offer the household choice over school of
attendance, and in this situation we would wish to assign the property a
school quality value proportional to the bundle of schools nearby. There are
cases in the data where attendance boundaries are not unique for this reason,
because or programs involving school choice.
2.3 Data
This section describes the data used in this paper.
SABINS
The SABINS project (School Attendance Boundary Information System)1
is the first comprehensive effort to assemble, unify, and disseminate GIS data
on school attendance boundaries (The College of William and Mary and the
Minnesota Population Center 2011). Funded by the NSF, the data was as-
sembled for school years 2009-2010 until 2011-2012. The project attempts
to determine the exact shapes of the school attendance boundaries. For this
reason, this data is considered the standard to which the other methods will
be tested for this paper. However, SABINS does not cover all areas of the
US, and coverage varies significantly by state. SABINS uses administrative
1http://www.sabinsdata.org
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information and converts this information to GIS maps of attendance bound-
aries for each school in its dataset (this includes all grades PK-12). These
attendance boundaries are much finer than school districts, and show areas
where properties are assigned to each school. SABINS is somewhat limited
in scope, covering only 3 school years (with almost all of its data in 2009-10
year) and only certain areas of the US. For this research, data was taken from
the SABINS website for academic year 2009-2010. This data includes GIS
shapefiles for all elementary school attendance boundaries in the SABINS
data. Properties are matched to their SABINS attendance boundary by GIS
through their census block latitude and longitude.
Figure 17: SABINS Data Coverage
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SABS
Very similar to SABINS, SABS data2 is collected by the Department of
Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), and contains
school attendance boundary information for much of the US at three school
levels (primary, middle, high) (Tai Phan 2015). This data is surveyed from
school district administrators. School districts have over 90 percent response
rate in SABS. Data from 2013-14 school year were collected. This data is
similar to SABINS but has better coverage and explicit labels for de facto
school districts (see below) and open attendance policies.
The map above shows the coverage of SABS for the 2013-14 school year.
These are the school districts which responded and sent data on their atten-
dance boundaries to SABS. The distinction is made between de facto and
non-de facto school districts, or districts which contain exactly one school
accommodating each grade and districts containing more than one school for
at least one grade, respectively. This distinction will be discussed at length
in a following section. Below is a detailed look at the data, with schools
represented as points and attendance boundaries represented as boxes.
Figure 19 illustrates schools and attendance boundaries. This is part of
Los Angeles Unified, one of the largest school districts in the U.S. Many parts
contain well behaved bijections of schools and attendance boundaries, with
one dot (school) inside one shape (attendance boundary.) Some areas are
missing in SABS, so while schools show up, boundaries do not (see Compton,
circled, and Inglewood areas.) Some attendance boundaries have multiple
2https://nces.ed.gov/programs/edge/SABS
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Figure 18: SABS Data Coverage
schools, usually indication a charter or other open enrollment school. It is
easy to find several areas inside one boundary with closer physical proximity
to a school in another attendance boundary (squared areas in the figure),
which demonstrates some of the concerns raised in the distance matching
section.
School Districts
Data for census blocks and school districts were taken from TIGER/line
shapefiles, provided by the US census. These data provide an exhaustive
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Figure 19: SABS Boundaries and Schools in Detail
Notes: 1. This figure depicts attendance boundaries (green boxes) and schools (green
dots) in Los Angeles 2. Some geographic areas are closer in proximity to a school which
they are not assigned to (examples in red boxes.) 3. Some areas in the data are missing
attendance boundaries (blue circle.)
map of all blocks and districts, as well as basic information about the areas.
Blocks are then mapped to school districts via GIS.
School Quality
School information is taken from the Common Core Data, as well as a
U.S. Department of Education test score release for all schools. These data
contain the quality variables to be assigned, including pupil-teacher ratio,
free and reduced-price lunch ratio, and math and reading test scores. Test
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scores are converted into Z scores within each state to be comparable between
states. Table 9 contains summary statistics for schools and table 10 contains
summary statistics for school districts, divided by de facto and non-defacto
districts.
School data contains latitude and longitude coordinates, needed for the
distance to be calculated. Distances from each census block to every school
in the same school district are calculated, and then each block receives a list
of its closest schools in distance order.
Table 9: Summary Statistics for School Quality Data, School Level
Variable n Mean S.D. Min .25 Mdn .75 Max
Total Students 21510 515.89 245.78 4.00 348.00 497.50 664.00 2837.00
Free-Reduced Lunch Students 20812 280.01 210.97 0.00 116.00 238.00 399.00 2546.00
Pupil-Teacher Ratio 21510 16.03 4.57 2.34 15.54 15.54 18.09 251.00
Math Pass Rate 21463 74.34 17.86 2.00 63.00 78.00 88.00 99.00
Reading Pass Rate 21465 72.26 18.80 2.50 60.00 77.00 87.00 99.00
Notes: 1. This table contains summary statistics for all schools. 2. Total students,
free-reduced lunch students, and pupil-teacher ratio are taken from common core data.
3. Math and reading pass rates are taken from a national data release for standardized
tests.
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Table 10: SABINS 2009 Summary Statistics, School Districts
Variable Description De facto Non-De facto
Count Number of Districts 3845 1437
Rural Defined by CCD 3132(81.5%) 421(30.3%)
Town 533(13.8%) 409(28.5%)
Suburb 177(4.6%) 393(27.3%)
City 3(0.08%) 214(14.9%)
Total Blocks Mean(SD) 480.72(310.61) 2002.52(3460.36)
Mean Block-School
Distance
Mean(SD) 8.05(4.89) 4.706(4.133)
First-Match
Prop
Mean(SD) 0.9347(0.247) .515(.230)
Total Teachers For all grades 50.95(33.29) 817.48(1895.28)
Total Students For all grades 691.1(502.3) 13738.4(33267.3)
Total Schools Including Grade 4 1(0) 8.1161(19.1392)
Notes: 1. This table contains summary statistics for all school districts contained in Sabins
2009. 2. Districts are divided into de facto and non-defacto, de facto districts being those
which contain exactly 1 school for elementary level. 3. Urban classification has 4 categories
defined by Common Core Data. 4. Block school distance is the distance between a block
and the nearest school. 5. First-match prop contains the proportion of blocks correctly
matched from distance to Sabins.
2.4 Accuracy
This section describes the accuracy of the various matching methods by
comparing them with the SABINS school. First is a test on matching vs
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Table 11: Match Rates for Blocks to Schools
SABINS
Blocks
SABINS
Coverage
Proportion
Matches
within 1
School
Matches
within 2
Schools
Matches
within 3
Schools
Matches
within 4
Schools
Total 4732069 0.48 0.71 0.83 0.87 0.89
Low 2367295 0.47 0.63 0.79 0.84 0.87
High 2364774 0.49 0.78 0.89 0.90 0.91
Notes: 1. This table contains the proportion of blocks which are correctly matched to
the school from Sabins data. 2. The table is divided into low and high match states. 3.
Blocks with a match within the nearest 4 schools are added by column to obtain
cumulative match with Sabins school.
mismatching accuracy for distance proximity; the tests for accuracy of school
quality matches is done afterwords.
Distance Proximity Matching Accuracy
For all states, the distance proximity match is used and compared against
SABINS matches. The top 4 closest schools are matched to each block, and
then the total number of correct matches in each distance rank is divided
by SABINS blocks to determine match proportion. In table 11, the results
are summarized by total matches for all states (Total), as well as for the top
half (high) and bottom half (low) of states by SABINS match. This is to
contrast the differences in match distribution between the states with the
best first-match and the states with the worst first-match.
The second column lists the number of blocks in each group which has a
SABINS school match, meaning it is inside an attendance boundary in the
62
SABINS data. As seen in the third column, the proportion of total blocks
covered by SABINS is a little less than half, and not dramatically different
between the groups. The next column shows the proportion of blocks whose
closet school is the same as it’s SABINS school, where from here we are only
counting blocks for which there is a SABINS match. The final columns track
the distribution of matches, where the SABINS school is the same as the
second, third, and fourth nearest school, respectively. The gap between high
and low match states starts at 16 percentage points (about 20% of the high
match rate) but decreases to only 4 pp (around 4%) at the fourth nearest
school. Some states have better matches than others. Why this might be
poses an interesting question for investigation. Straight line distance seems
to better match blocks to schools for flat states than mountainous ones (KS,
MO, NE among the best matched; NC, TN, CO among the worst.) Topogra-
phy, as mentioned before, might play an important part in the usefulness of
a distance match. Other proposed covariates of match are population growth
over the last 10 years (tract level), date of school openings in district, and
number of schools in the district. Each of these can relate to the number of
schools in a district, the regularity of attendance boundary shapes and the
number of changes to attendance boundaries.
One item to note is that SABINS coverage is not a strong predictor of
first-school match. The proportion of blocks in each state which are included
in the SABINS data is compared to the accuracy of the match in that state.
For example, states in the low-match category have 47% of their blocks in
SABINS data, compared to high-match states with 49%. The correlation be-
tween a state’s SABINS coverage and that state’s accurately matched blocks
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is almost exactly zero. It would be a cause for concern of external validity
if SABINS appeared to be cherry-picking the easiest places to create their
data, while omitting places which were difficult to map. This test seems to
suggest that the states for which we have a lot of data from SABINS are not
significantly different from those we have little data from SABINS, in terms
of the accuracy of match to first school.
De Facto vs. Non-De Facto Districts
As mentioned previously, a de facto school district is one where the school
attendance boundary is the same as the district boundary, because the dis-
trict contains exactly one school of that type. Many districts are set up
this way in the U.S., and the accuracy of distance matching is almost en-
tirely dependent on a district being de facto or not. These schools/districts
can be useful because it is very easy, even without attendance boundary
data, to match properties to the correct school either by distance or through
district-level data. De facto districts are typically much smaller in number
of students and teachers, smaller in distance, and rural in urban code. To
take two examples, consider first Los Angeles Unified School District, one of
the largest school districts in the US.
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Figure 20: L.A. Unified School District
L.A. Unified has an area of over 720 square miles. It enrolls over 640,000
students with over 900 public schools and over 180 charter schools. The area
it covers has a population of over 4.5m in over 1.5m households. In contrast,
consider Hershey Public School District in Nebraska.
65
Figure 21: Hershey Public School District
Hershey has an area of 351 square miles. It enrolls fewer than 500 stu-
dents, and has just 3 public schools (one for each school level), making it a
de facto district. It has a population around 2,200 with around 860 house-
holds. Clearly school districts in urban California and rural Nebraska will be
very different. When using aggregate data at the district level, it’s not clear
why school districts should be the appropriate units of comparison. While
families might compare at the district level when choosing between de facto
districts, the comparison would be at a much finer level within the very large
districts.
Table 10 shows summary statistics for the two types of district for SABINS
2009-10. The total number of districts are listed for each type, with de facto
districts being much more numerous though smaller in area and students than
non-de facto districts. Urban classification, as defined by the ccd, shows the
proportion of districts in the rural/town/suburb/city categories. Nearly all
of the de facto districts are rural or town classification, while non-defacto
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districts are much more evenly spread over the categories. On average, de
facto districts contain fewer than 500 census blocks, while non-de facto dis-
tricts contain over 2000 blocks. Block to school distance and the proportion
of correct matches to the closest school are higher for de facto districts. Total
teachers, and total students are much higher for non-defacto districts.
To explore patterns in where and when distance proximity will be a suit-
able proxy for the true school, I regress the match rate on geographic fea-
tures, including dummies for rural and de facto district. Rural and de facto
are separated into the possible combinations, since many rural distracts are
also de facto. Table 12 contains the results. Other variables besides de facto
have almost no explanatory power, though they significant, once de facto
is accounted for. Note, in particular, that the R2 drops from 0.39 to 0.06
once de facto districts are dropped. Variables include average distance in
the district from blocks to closest school in miles, a rural dummy, number of
students(thousand), 10 year population growth for the county that district
is in (hundred thousand), and number of schools in the district.
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Table 12: Regression Results for District Block Match
Full Sample Excluding De Facto
Mean School Block Distance
-0.021***
(0.00073)
-0.007***
(0.00161)
Rural = 1, Defacto = 0
0.365***
(0.01243)
0.050***
(0.01418)
Rural = 0, Defacto = 1
0.035**
(0.01438)
Rural = 1, Defacto = 1
0.483***
(0.01007)
Number of Students (Thousand)
-0.003***
(0.00089)
-0.002**
(0.00084)
County Population Growth (Hundred Thousand)
0.031***
(0.00533)
0.029***
(0.00517)
Number of Schools in District
0.004***
(0.00097)
0.003***
(0.00092)
Constant
0.486***
(0.00928)
0.506***
(0.01075)
Adj. R-Squared 0.3941 0.0625
Observations 5247 1435
Notes: 1. All regressions are split into a full sample (all school districts) and excluding
de facto schools. 2. Regressions are at the school district level. 3. Mean school block
distance is the average distance from each block to the nearest school. 4. Rural label is
defined by the common core. Categories are made for rural non-de facto, non-rural de
facto, and rural de facto. 5. County population growth is measured as the percent growth
from 2000-2010.
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School Quality Assignment Accuracy
Given the potential to match blocks to the wrong school, the next ques-
tion to consider is whether these mismatches are important when assigning
school quality. In terms of the relevant characteristics of the school, do the
assignment methods assign significantly different values to properties? To
answer, school quality measures are assigned to each census block covered by
SABINS data.
Two samples are created for correlation of school quality. The first sam-
ple contains only blocks that have multiple schools assigned to them. This
excludes blocks in de facto districts, which will have identical assignment
from all sources with data on school quality. This leaves those blocks with
the issue of school assignment only. The full sample contains all eligible
blocks. The first sample will include de facto districts, which means many
assignment measures are identical for these observations. Correlation tables
for the first sample are presented with the results, and correlation tables for
the second sample are presented in the appendix. The first sample contains
2,322,582 blocks; the second sample contains 4,357,816 blocks.
The baseline for comparison is the quality assignment from SABINS. The
assignment methods compared are nearest distance matching, second nearest
distance matching, distance rank matching, and district means assignment.
The school quality measures assigned to blocks are student-faculty ratio,
free and reduced lunch proportion of students, 4th grade math test scores
and 4th grade reading test scores. The test score data uses a Z score for
pass rate relative to other schools in the state. The correlation of interest is
each assignment method’s quality with SABINS quality. This is presented
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in column 1 of the correlation tables.
Overall, the rank weight distance match has the highest correlation across
all measures of school quality in the first sample. Nearest distance match per-
forms only slightly worse; district means lags significantly behind these two
across all variables. Second nearest distance match has the lowest corre-
lation, and is included mostly as a comparison to nearest distance for the
importance of matching accuracy.
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Student-Faculty Ratio
This variable measures the ratio of enrolled students of all grades to full
time equivalent teachers, as defined by the common core. For blocks in the
sample of interest, the nearest school has a correlation of 0.69 with SABINS
assignment. Second nearest school has a poor correlation by itself (0.2001)
but the rank-weight assignment improves the correlation from the nearest
distance match, although only slightly. District mean assignment has a 0.44
correlation with SABINS quality. Results for the correlation for student-
faculty ratio assignment are seen in Table 13.
Table 13: Correlation for Student-Faculty Ratio, Sample 1
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. SABINS School -
2. Nearest Distance Match 0.6929 -
3. Second-Nearest Distance Match 0.2001 0.1939 -
4. Rank Weight Assignment 0.6964 0.9604 0.3338 -
5. District Mean Assignment 0.4403 0.4687 0.4077 0.5029 -
Notes: 1. This table contains correlations for the assigned Student-Faculty Ratio. Each
block has its quality assigned by all methods and then the assigned values tested for
correlation. Sabins is the reference for proper school quality. 2. Second-Nearest match is
included for reference, though it is not used outside of the rank weight assignment.
Free and Reduced Price Lunch Proportion
This variable measures the proportion of students enrolled eligible for
free and reduced price lunch. This variable has higher correlations across
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Table 14: Correlation for Free and Reduced Lunch Proportion, Sample 1
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. SABINS School -
2. Nearest Distance Match 0.9113 -
3. Second-Nearest Distance Match 0.6140 0.5935 -
4. Rank Weight Assignment 0.9213 0.9768 0.6889 -
5. District Mean Assignment 0.6987 0.6996 0.5479 0.7363 -
Notes: 1. This table contains correlations for the assigned free and reduced lunch
proportion of students. Each block has its quality assigned by all methods and then the
assigned values tested for correlation. Sabins is the reference for proper school quality. 2.
Second-Nearest match is included for reference, though it is not used outside of the rank
weight assignment.
all assignment methods with SABINS, especially with nearest distance and
rank weight distance matching, with 0.91 and 0.92 correlation respectively.
Rank weight again provides a slight improvement to distance matching, and
the high correlations are likely due to the fact that free and reduced price
lunch are measuring family income, which is highly spatially concentrated.
All results for correlations of free and reduced price lunch proportion are
found in Table 14.
Math and Reading Test Scores
These variables are taken from a national release for standardized tests.
Pass rates for the tests are normalized for the average pass rates from all
schools in the state. The two scores are similar in their correlation of assign-
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Table 15: Correlation for Math Scores, Sample 1
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. SABINS School -
2. Nearest Distance Match 0.8051 -
3. Second-Nearest Distance Match 0.6027 0.5204 -
4. Rank Weight Assignment 0.8328 0.9508 0.7479 -
5. District Mean Assignment 0.5817 0.5642 0.5402 0.6277 -
Notes: 1. This table contains correlations for the assigned math scores. Each block has
its quality assigned by all methods and then the assigned values tested for correlation.
Sabins is the reference for proper school quality. 2. Math scores are standardized to a Z
score within each state so they can be compared between states. 3. Second-Nearest
match is included for reference, though it is not used outside of the rank weight
assignment.
ment, with reading being slightly more correlated across all methods. Rank
weight improves on nearest distance by nearly 0.03, and again outperforms
the other assignment methods. District mean assignment has a correlation
of less than 0.6 for both test scores. All results for math test scores are
presented in table 15, and reading test scores in table 16.
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Table 16: Correlation for Reading Scores, Sample 1
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. SABINS School -
2. Nearest Distance Match 0.8237 -
3. Second-Nearest Distance Match 0.6452 0.5721 -
4. Rank Weight Assignment 0.8504 0.9558 0.7788 -
5. District Mean Assignment 0.5960 0.5778 0.5575 0.6359 -
Notes: 1. This table contains correlations for the assigned reading scores. Each block has
its quality assigned by all methods and then the assigned values tested for correlation.
Sabins is the reference for proper school quality. 2. Reading scores are standardized to a
Z score within each state so they can be compared between states. 3. Second-Nearest
match is included for reference, though it is not used outside of the rank weight
assignment.
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School Quality Assignment Errors
When assigning school quality, assignment be distance, rank, and district
all contain errors. The distribution of these errors is important for the va-
lidity of estimates based on such assignment. For all assignment methods
and school quality variables, kernal density graphs are generated to show the
distribution of assignment error. For assignment by distance (closest school),
errors are not distributed normally. For assignment by rank, errors become
closer to a normal distribution. Finally, assignment by district means has
errors which are normally distributed. Figure 22 shows the kernal density
graphs for math score assignment errors for distance, rank, and district as-
signment. Other school quality variables are shown in the appendix.
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Figure 22: Kernal Density for Assignment Error, Math Scores
Notes: 1. Graph 1 shows the assignment error for closest school assignment, graph 2 for
distance-rank assignment, and graph 3 for district mean assignment. 2. All graphs show
math test score assignment. 3. All errors are calculated as assigned quality minus Sabins.
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2.5 Conclusion
Matching properties to schools presents a unique and interesting data
problem. Through the use of a near-ideal but geographically limited data
set, SABINS, it is possible to test various methods to see how accurate they
are. Distance Proximity is a fairly accurate approximation overall, but be-
comes inaccurate in the districts with difficult assignment (non-de facto).
The accuracy of distance proximity matching depends on local factors such
as topography, population growth, and new school openings. For school
quality measures, rank weighted assignment improves on the nearest school
assignment; District means assignment performs the worst among assignment
methods.
In the absence of strong data such as SABINS/SABS, school assignment
has been done using various matching methods. For the sample of all dis-
tricts, closest proximity and rank weighted assignment do well at assigning
the proper school quality, while district means do much worse. In the sam-
ple of districts with multiple schools, assignment is less accurate, with rank
weighted and distance still outperforming district means assignment.
Because such school quality assignments are less than perfect, estimates
of the value of school quality which depend on quality assignment are also
less than perfect. Districts and states vary in their characteristics which
strengthen or worsen these assignments. For large, non-de facto districts,
reliable attendance boundary data becomes important for reliable quality
assignment and value estimation.
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Appendix
Table 17: Correlation for Student-Faculty Ratio, Sample 2
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4.
1. SABINS School -
2. Nearest Distance Match 0.8893 -
3. Rank Weight Assignment 0.8938 0.9867 -
4. District Mean Assignment 0.8339 0.8546 0.8739 -
Table 18: Correlation for Free and Reduced Lunch Proportion, Sample 2
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4.
1. SABINS School -
2. Nearest Distance Match 0.9379 -
3. Rank Weight Assignment 0.9454 0.9839 -
4. District Mean Assignment 0.8008 0.8011 0.8295 -
Table 19: Correlation for Math Scores, Sample 2
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4.
1. SABINS School -
2. Nearest Distance Match 0.8666 -
3. Rank Weight Assignment 0.8846 0.9714 -
4. District Mean Assignment 0.6342 0.6249 0.6629 -
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Table 20: Correlation for Reading Scores, Sample 2
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4.
1. SABINS School -
2. Nearest Distance Match 0.8774 -
3. Rank Weight Assignment 0.8958 0.9724 -
4. District Mean Assignment 0.6447 0.6329 0.6707 -
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Figure 23: Kernal Density for Assignment Error, Student-Teacher Ratio
Notes: 1. Graph 1 shows the assignment error for closest school assignment, graph 2 for
distance-rank assignment, and graph 3 for district mean assignment. 2. All graphs show
student teacher ratio assignment. 3. All errors are calculated as assigned quality minus
Sabins.
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Figure 24: Kernal Density for Assignment Error, Free-Reduced Lunch
Notes: 1. Graph 1 shows the assignment error for closest school assignment, graph 2 for
distance-rank assignment, and graph 3 for district mean assignment. 2. All graphs show
free-reduced lunch assignment. 3. All errors are calculated as assigned quality minus
Sabins.
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Figure 25: Kernal Density for Assignment Error, Reading Scores
Notes: 1. Graph 1 shows the assignment error for closest school assignment, graph 2 for
distance-rank assignment, and graph 3 for district mean assignment. 2. All graphs show
reading test score assignment. 3. All errors are calculated as assigned quality minus
Sabins.
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